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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HARRY L. YOUNG & SONS, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH and 
DENNIS ASHTON, 
Defendants< 
DEFENDANTS' BRIEF 
Case No. 13866 
DEFENDANTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff's "Statement of Facts" is substantially correct 
as to the facts therein stated but Defendants wish to make the 
following modifications to it. 
The lease of the Kenworth tractor (R.189,Exhibit 7) must 
include the finding that the registered owner of the vehicle 
was at all times H.L. Young and Sons, Inc. (R.203,Exhibit 20). 
Oversize permits listed H.L. Young and Sons, Inc. as registered 
owner (R.195,Exhibit 13). Overweight permits listed the same 
ownership (R.196,Exhibit 14). The discussions regarding the 
lease of the truck took place in the offices of H.L. Young and 
Sons, Inc. with one Woody Snider (R.46,47). The repair of 
truck 2150 was with the approval of Mr. Snider (R.48). Mr. 
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Snider represented himself to be a representative of Inland 
Transport, Inc., (R.49), Mr. Snider was the representative 
of Intermountain Accounting Corporation and signed the Agree-
ment to Maintain a Reserve Account (R.50,190,Exhibit 8). Mr. 
Snider was designated as the individual to act under the 
Power of Attorney authorizing the deposit of defendant's money 
to the reserve account (R.199,Exhibit 16). It was necessary 
for defendant to obtain approval from Snider prior to taking 
out any load for H.L. Young and Sons, Inc. (R.147). Snider 
advised as to the number of miles defendant should drive 
each month (R.148). Defendant was advised to take an over-
load or take no load at all (R.155). Plaintiff fined defendant 
$15.00 for exceeding the speed limit (R.194). Defendant was 
required to make check point calls in accordance with trip 
plans (R.192,Exhibit 10; R.193,Exhibit 11) and testimony in 
support thereof (R.115 to R.120). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ASHTON WAS NOT AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR AND WAS, IN 
FACT, AN EMPLOYEE OF YOUNG FOR WORKMENS COMPENSATION 
PURPOSES. 
In reviewing all of the evidence, it must be born in mind 
that the separate corporations of Inland Transport, Inc., 
Intermountain Accounting Corp. and H.L. Young and Sons, Inc. 
were at all times represented by the same individual - E.D. 
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Snider. Inland Transport never established that it actually 
owned by title or registration truck 2150. At all times 
Young was the registered owner and its representative -
Snider - was at all times acting essentially for Young. 
The evidence is clear that at best the separate corpora-
tions were established as paper companies to avoid at all 
costs the establishment of an employment relationship with 
Young by the defendant. It seems obvious that the lease 
should have run from the owner,Youftg,to the lessee,Ashton. 
The assignment of revenue should have run from Young to the 
accountant. The Power of Attorney should have designated the 
accounting company as the holder of the power to handle the 
money. 
The record seems to be very clear that there was some 
reason for what was being done. The obvious answer was to 
avoid employment. 
At midpoint in the evedentiary hearing the commissioner 
granted a motion to dismiss as to both Inland Transport, Inc. 
and Intermountain Accounting Corp. on the obvious grounds 
that neither was in any position to control directly or in-
directly the activities of Ashton (R.142). The record to that 
point and subsequent was very clear that Young not only had 
the right to control but, in fact, exercised the same. 
Defendant concurred in the dismissal. 
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Arthur Larson in his definitive work - The Law of 
Workmens Compensation - at paragraph 44.0 writes as follows: 
"44. Contractor Distinction: Right to Control Details. 
44.00 The traditional test of the employer-employee 
relation is the right of the employer to control 
the details of the work. It is the ultimate right 
of control, under the agreement with the employee, 
not the overt exercise of that right, which is 
decisive. If the right of control of the details 
goes no farther than is necessary to ensure a 
satisfactory end result, it does not establish 
employment. The principal factors showing right 
of control are (1) direct evidence of right or 
exercise of control; (2) method of payment; (3) the 
furnishing of equipment; and (4) the right to fire." 
In category (1) above the record is replete with the 
actual exercise of direct control ranging from pre-employ-
ment tests (R.185,Exhibit 3, R.208,Exhibit 23),to the fine 
(R.194), to approval to take out a load (R.147), to the 
number of miles to drive (R.148) and all of the other details 
required by Snider. 
In category (2) the record shows that Young agreed to 
pay Ashton on a mileage basis of .33 per mile less incurred 
expenses (R.144). This method is nothing more than piece 
work. 
With respect to item (3) the furnishing of equipment, 
the record is very clear that at all times material the 
truck was not only owned but registered in the name of Young. 
There is no evidence of either ownership or registration in 
the name of Inland, the purported lessor. The equipment was 
Young's. All the trailers were registered in the nam** Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of Young (R.99) and Young would be responsible for the 
contents. The I C C authority was Young's. 
In the matter of item (4) the right to fire, it is 
very evident that Snider had such a right as the agent of 
Young. He, in fact, exercised this right at the eventual 
termination of Ashton. 
Larson at section 44.20 p.648 (The Law of Workmens 
Compensation) writes: 
"Similarly, if the control o f i trucker'^oes no-
further than directions oh where to pick up or put down 
the load, this is usually held to be a part of the 
end result. 
But this idea of calling 'details1 like speed and 
location a part of the end result cannot be pressed 
too far. The point at /Which the lihe must be drawn 
is aptly stated in the Barlion case relying on the 
Roth case: 
The whole project involved many inter depend-
ent details, the control of any one of which 
could not be surrendered without disorganiz-
ation of the whole. (Pennsylvania Railroad v. 
Barlion, 172F 2d 710,711, and Pennsylvania 
Railroad v. Roth, 163F 2d 161)." 
The case of Bowser v Industrial Accident Commission. 
182 Ore. 42, 185 P 2d 891. classified as employees log 
truckers who owned their own trucks and were paid by the 
quantity of logs carried. 
In the Utah case of Sutton v Industrial Commission 9U 
2d 339, 344 P 2d 538, the defendant contended that the 
claimant was an employee of an independent contractor. 
-5-
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This was rejected by the court which said in part: 
"While the elements of control by the employer 
and the intent of the parties are the most important 
ones, none of the factors separately is controlling." 
With respect to method of payment Professor Larson 
states at section 44.33(b) -
"Payment on a completed project basis is indicative 
of independent contractor status. Payment on a 
piece work or commission basis is consistent with 
either status....The majority of modern decisions 
awarding compensation give little weight to the fact 
that a trucker, cutter or loader is compensated 
at so much per thousand feet of logs or lumber, 
per tie, per ton of stone, per yard of gravel, or 
per load mile.... 
Larson states further at section 44.34'-" 
"When the employer furnishes valuable equipment 
the relationship is almost invariably that of 
employment. When the employee furnishes such 
equipment, this circumstance may, if coupled with 
other factors, indicate independent contractorship, 
but in itself it is not necessarily fatal to a 
showing of employment based on other grounds.... 
From this rationale it also follows that control 
may be realistically inferred even when the employer 
owns only a part of the equipment, if that part is 
of considerable size and value. For example, it is 
becomming quite common for employers to own fleets 
of trailers, and to contract with owner-drivers of 
tractors to haul the trailers. In cases involving 
this arrangement the trailer owners have been held 
to be employers, apparently on the theory stated 
above, that the trailer-owner presumably would 
have to reserve the right to control the way his 
trailer was handled. (James v McDonald, 73 S.D. 
78, 39 N.W. 2d 478; Calvert v Industrial Coram. 
55 Ohio L. Abs. 407, 90 N.E. 2d 424)" 
Inspite of these arguments, there is a growing 
tendency to classify owner-drivers of trucks as 
employees when they perform continuous service which 
-6-
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in an integral part of the employer's business.11 
The plaintiff1s position is that Ashton was the owner 
of the tractor. Conceding, for purposes of argument that 
this is true, the record is also clear that Young owned 
and controlled the trailer and contents. (R.99). On 
Professor Larson's theory, Young had the greater interest 
in the equipment being used and of necessity to protect 
that interest was required to exercise a great deal of 
control. As an example Young had a speed limit 5 miles 
per hour less than the highway posted speed limit (R.69, 
Exhibit 12). Obviously, the speed restrictions, the 
check points, the call ins, everything that Young did was 
prudent and correct to assure the proper handling of 
Young's equipment. 
Plaintiff has cited Gallegos v. Stringham 21u 2d 139, 
442 P 2d 31 and the contents thereof are clear in establish-
ing that, in fact, an employer-employee relationship 
did exist. This court pointed out the elements of control 
necessary to establish the relationship. 
"Defendant was told when to speed his trips and 
when to back up to the traxcavator and when to drive 
away, and he could not haul dirt in any other manner 
than as he was told." 
* * * * 
If the driver of the truck failed to maintain his posi-
tion in line, the foreman of Gibbons and Reed 
could stop the truck from hauling." 
-7~ 
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Further the court explained: 
"Because Gibbons and Reed paid ten dollars per 
hour for the use of the truck, including the driver, 
it could not afford to let jt,he:,driver determine-
the amount of work to be done. Such a rate of pay 
justified and made necessary the control of the 
movement of the truck by the company." 
In the light of these facts, the court concluded 
that an employer-employee relationship had been demonstra-
ted. 
It is interesting to relate this to the case at bar. 
The first portion deals with the details of the work -
markedly similar to the details described by Ashton as to 
what Young required. The second quoted section details 
the right of the employer to terminate - virtually the same 
right exercised by Snider as agent of Young. And the 
third dealing with compensation at a high rate which includ-
ed the equipment - not substantially different than the 
.33 cents per mile paid by Young. 
Defendant agrees that Luker Sand and Gravel v. 
Industrial Commission 82 U 188, 23 P 2d 225 and Kinder v. 
Industrial Commission 106 U 448, 150 P 2d 109 are control-
ling cases generally in the area of the exercise of control 
and the right to control. One can quote extensively from 
each and distinguish and compare all three with Gallegos 
and reach an entirely different conclusion than that reached 
by defendant. 
-8-
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POINT II 
ASSUMING ASHTON WAS AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR, ASHTON 
IS NEVERTHELESS ENTITLED TO VTORKMENS COMPENSATION 
BENEFITS BECAUSE HE IS IN THE SAME EMPLOYMENT AS 
YOUNG AND IS A STATUTORY EMPLOYEE 
For purposes of argument only and without conceding 
that Ashton was not an employee, let us assume that Ashton 
was an "independent contractor" as claimed by plaintiff. 
Section 35-1-42 U.C.A. 1953 provides in part: 
* * * * . # „ . . 
"Where any employer procures any work to be done 
wholly or in part for him by a contractor over 
whose work he retains supervision or control and 
such work is a part or process in the trade or bus-
iness of the employer, such contractor, and all 
persons employed by him, and all subcontractors 
under him, and all persons employed by any such 
subcontractors, shall be deemed# within the meaning 
of this section, employees of such original employer* 
Any person, firm or corporation engaged in the 
performance of work as an independent contractor shall 
be deemed an employer within the meaning of this 
section* The term "independent contractor", as here-
in used, is defined to be any person, association or 
corporation engaged in the performance of any work 
for another, who while so engaged, is independent 
of the employer in all that pertains to the execu-
tion of the work, is not subject to the rule or control 
of the employer, is engaged only in the performance 
of a definite job or piece of work and is subordin-
ate to the employer only in effecting a result in 
accordance with the employees design." 
Section 35-1-62, U.C.A. 1953 provides in part: 
"When any injury or death for which c ompensation 
is payable under this title shall have been caused 
by the wrongful act or neglect of another person 
not in the same employment, the injured employee, 
or in case of death his dependents, may claim compensa-
tion and the injured employee or his heirs or personal 
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representative may also have an action for 
damages against such third persons... I*(Under- ^ 
scoring added) 
By the interpretation placed on these two sections 
this court has recently denied a number of third party 
suits involving subcontractors and their employees in actions 
brought against either the general contractor or other sub-
contractors. The theory behind these cases seems to be 
that "the same employment" includes general contractors# 
sub-contractors and employees of sub-contractors. Smith v. 
Alfred Brown Co. 27 U 2d 155, 493 P 2d 994., Gallegos v. 
Stringham, 21 U 2d 139, 442 P 2d 31,- Doyle v. Facilities, 
Inc., 29 U 2d 41, 504 P 2d 1006. 
If section 35-1-42, supra, were paraphrased, it 
could be phrased as follows: Where any employer (Young) 
procures any work to be done (hauling trailers) by a 
contractor (Ashton) over whose work he (Young) retains 
supervision or control and such work is a part or process 
in the trade or business (transporting trailers) of the 
employer (Young) such contractor (jtshton) shall be deemed 
an employee of such original employer (Young). 
The only elements necessary to establish the above 
relationship is to demonstrate that the employer has 
retained some supervision or control over the sub-contr-
actor and that they are both engaged in the same trade or 
business. The record is full of instances of control 
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and supervision by Young. Such control is absolutely 
essential for the orderly operation of Young's business. 
It is likewise clear that Young1s business was the same 
as Ashton - ie the transportation of trailers from place 
to place. 
In Smith v Alfred Brown Co., supra, this court found 
that masonry work was apart or process of the trade 
or business of a building contractor, thus making masonry 
subcontractors1 employee an employee of the general con-
tractor under this section. It would appear logical that 
the sub-contractor himself is also an employee. 
This situation is identical with the case at bar. 
Ashton as the sub-contractor under Young is in the same 
employment as Young. Plaintiff would not seriously 
contend that Ashton is so independent of Young that Ashton 
could sue Young as a third party tort claimant. If Young 
could not be held responsible as a negligent third party, 
then Ashton must be treated as being in the same employ-
ment as Young and, therefore, an employee. 
Referring to the first part of Section 35-1-42, 
supra, it may be significant to cover the necessary elements 
to establish the relationship. There is no question but 
what Young is "an employer". Young in fact "procurred 
work to be done" by Ashton. The transportation of trailers 
is, in fact,"a part or process of the trade or business" of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Young. Young did in fact retain some "supervision or 
control" over the activities of Ashton* It necessarily 
follows that Ashton himself and "all persons employed by" 
Ashton and "all other sub-contractors under" Ashton 
are, in fact, statutory employees of Young. 
The next sentence of Section 35-1-42, supra, defines 
what an independent contractor is. Please note the lan-
guage "independent of the employer in all that pertains 
to the execution of the work." (Underscoring added). 
The additional language "is engaged only in the performance 
of a definite job or piece of work". The relationship 
between Young and Ashton was an ongoing thing not limited 
to one job or piece of work. And finally, "is subordin-
ate to the employer only in effecting a result in accord-
ance with the employers design." Even if the facts can 
be extended to this standard on behalf of Young, Young 
can still be held to be a statutory employer - if any 
right of supervision, direction or control is present. 
CONCLUSION 
The Industrial Commission's Findings of Pact should 
be affirmed and the Order issued thereon should be sustained 
that Ashton was either an employee of Young or as an 
independent contractor was a statutory employee of Young 
and as such is entitled to workmens compensation. 
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Respectfully submitted this N^day of May, 1975. 
VERNON B. ROMNEY, Attorney General 
State of Utah 
Attorney for I n d u s t r i a l Coiranission 
S ta t e Capitol Building 
Sa l t Lake City , Utah 84114 
and 
ROBERT J. SHAUGHNESSY, Attorney for 
Dennis Ashton, 
543 East 5th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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